Corruption’s vice by Neill of Bladen, Lord Patrick
by Lord Neill of Bladen QC
The audience at the Sixteenth Symposium on Economic Crime 
was addressed by Lord Neill of Bladen QC, who examined the 
link between the work of the Committee on Standards in Public 
life (which he now chairs) and much of the subject matter of the 
remainder of the symposium programme.
on Standards in Public Life since November 1997
I t is a well-known fact that there is a greater critical mass of experts on all aspects of economic crime gathered in Cambridge annually than can be found anywhere else in the 
world. Particularly impressive to me is the international 
dimension. More than eighty countries are represented and 
there are some 800 delegates. Professor Rider's letter of 
invitation to me included the following:
'The Symposium willjbcus on two themes   the prevention and 
control of abuse in the public sector and also in the financial markets.'
I accepted his invitation because it seemed to me that those 
themes had a strong resonance for the work of the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life. I have the honour to be the 
chairman of that committee, having succeeded Lord Nolan, its 
first chairman, about a year ago. My impression of the linkage 
between [the studies underlying the symposium] and my 
committee's work was confirmed by the detailed programme for 
the symposium which includes such themes as:
(a) The impact of economic crime on economic and political 
stability (I stress the last words).
(b) Fraud and economic crime in the public sector.
(c) Corruption in the public sector.
(d) Corruption in the international context.
(e) Procurement frauds.
(f) Corrupting the political system.
(g) Ethics in government.
Obviously I am making a selection, but I pick those which are 
close to my committee's work.
As I thought about these topics it occurred to me that the 
point at which economic crime and abuse ot public office 
converge is where there is corruption of a public official or a 
public agency for economic gain. That is why the anti- 
corruption efforts of international organisations over the last few
years are so significant and so much to be welcomed. To 
illustrate this I refer to the work of the Organisation of
o
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). I pick out 
as its great achievement in this field the Convention on Combating 
Briben of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
That convention was signed in Paris some nine months ago.
o o
All the OECD nations signed, together with five others, 
including Argentina. Only recently a workshop was held in 
Buenos Aires on combating bribery in international business 
transactions. That workshop was sponsored by the OECD, the 
OAS (Organisation of American States) and the Government of 
Argentina, in co-operation with the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID).
THE OECD CONVENTION
As you know, under art. 1.1 of the convention each signatory 
state undertakes to take the necessary measures to establish that 
it is a criminal offence:
'Jor a person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue 
pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through 
intermediaries, to a foreign public official Jor that official or Jor a third 
party in order that the ojficial act or refrain from acting in relation to 
the performance of ojficial duties, in order to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage in the conduct oj international business.'
Of course, the thrust of this is that it must be made a crime   
if it is not one already   to bribe ajoreign public official (it is 
implicit that the law of each signatory state already makes it a 
crime to bribe officials in the home state in order to gain 
economic advantage).
'Foreign public official' is very broadly defined to mean:
'any person holding a legislative, administrative, or judicial office oja 
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a 
public Junction Jor ajoreign country, including Jor a public agency or 
public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international 
organisation. '
So buying and selling agencies, import and export agencies, 
ministries charged with placing arms contracts or construction 
contracts are all within the net.
You may say: 'And high time too'. The fact is that for many a 
long year states have adopted a relaxed attitude to foreign bribes: 
'Oh, that is a matter for the foreign state concerned. It is not for 
us to export our standards (assuming we have any) across the 
globe.' This attitude went hand in hand with the tax treatment 
of money expended on bribes. Even where the purpose was 
quite explicit, the tax authorities of many countries took the 
view that, provided that it was customary to pay a bribe to win a 
contract in the foreign country under consideration, then such 
expenditure should be allowed as a normal business expense. 
Clearly such an attitude is guaranteed to perpetuate   and indeed 
to encourage   foreign bribery.
WHY IS CORRUPTION WRONG? WHAT 
HARM DOES IT DO?
That brings me to a theme which I believe to be important and 
which lies at the heart of many of the debates here this week. 
The answer is   of course   that corruption causes a great deal 
of harm and its pernicious influence is felt in many directions. I 
want to consider with you two or three statements about the 
effect of corruption.
Let me take three statements all promulgated within the last 
twelve months.
Lima
The 8th International Conference Against Corruption took place in 
Lima last September. Citizens of 93 countries were represented. 
The Conference published a declaration which stated:
'Corruption erodes the moral fabric of every society; violates the social 
and economic rights of the poor and vulnerable; undermines democracy; 
subverts the rule of'law which is the basis of every civilised society; retards 
development; and denies societies, and particularly the poor, the benefits 
of free and open competition.'
Now clearly there is a certain political content to that way of 
stating the matter. The heavy emphasis on the position of the 
poor may tend to obscure the fact that corruption has a 
damaging effect on the whole community irrespective of 
financial status. But what I like about the Lima Declaration, 
viewing it from the perspective of my committee, is the language: 
'Corruption erodes the moral fabric of every society, ... 
[corruption] ... undermines democracy.' I want to come back 
to the destruction of morality and the subversion of political 
freedom.
The Council of Europe
The Working Group on Criminal Law in November 1997 
adopted the following text as a preamble to a draft Convention 
on Corruption:
'Corruption threatens the rule of law, democracy and human rights, 
undermines good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts 
competition, hinders economic development, and endangers the stability oj 
democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society.'
Many lawyers present will seize on the threat to the rule of law 
and human rights. Economists will applaud the reference to the 
hindering of economic development and the distortion of
competition; but again, speaking for myself, I value the 
references to endangering 'the stability of democratic 
institutions and the moral foundations of society'.
The OECD Convention itself
The first recital to the Convention states:
'Considering that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in 
international business transactions, including trade and investment, 
which raises serious moral and political concerns, undermines good 
governance and economic development, and distorts international 
competitive conditions'.
Here, the first attack on corruption is that 'it raises serious 
moral and political concerns'. The theme is the same as in the 
other two texts but perhaps expressed in more guarded 
language.
The Lima Declaration had no doubt that corruption 'erodes 
the moral fabric of every society and . .. undermines 
democracy'. Its effects went beyond 'raising concerns'. Likewise 
the Council of Europe in its Draft Convention. But let us walk 
past the verbal differences. The two key elements of corruption 
on which I want to focus are the damage to the moral fabric of 
society- and the threat to democracy and political institutions.
In connection with the last point it is interesting to note that, 
following on from the Negotiating Conference which led to the 
signature of the convention, the OECD Council agreed in 
December last to do further work on particular topics. These 
include: 'bribery acts in relation to foreign political parties'.
CORRUPTION AT WORK
Let us look at some examples of corruption at work. A local 
authority puts out to tender a contract to build a bridge. There 
is a favoured local contractor who is   as the phrase is   'well in 
with' the local authority. A corrupt official informs that 
contractor of the rival bids. He puts in a lower tender and gets 
the job. Later he submits inflated claims for extras and he ends 
up receiving much more than any of the rival bidders would have 
been paid. An impossible scenario you are going to say? I think 
not.
What is the effect if the foregoing facts are known oro o
suspected? First, what is the effect on the rival bidders? A feeling 
of despair. What is the point of putting in a bid to a local 
authority such as this? Then comes the thought either 'It is a 
useless exercise' or   worse still   'The only way to win next time 
is to pay a bigger bribe'. That is the destruction of morality.
And what of the local electors? They feel embittered and 
powerless. Especially is that true where a council is for many 
years in the hands of the same political party. Certainly all those 
who did not vote for that party will feel that their democratic 
rights at a local level are valueless. If they complain, they are met 
with a conspiracy of silence. The law is no help. The evidence is 
circumstantial or anecdotal and, in any event, justice is too 
expensive.
Let me take another example (and here I hope that it is a very 
hypothetical example). Suppose that a significant contribution is 
made to the funds of a foreign political party in order to secure 
the election of that party so that, when in power, it will favour 
the business interests of the person, corporation or, maybe, 
government, providing the money. That is straightforward
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corruption of the political process on a grand scale. The 
democratic rights of the voters are overborne. If the facts 
become known, or even suspected, public alienation and 
outright cynicism are the inevitable results.
My third example is specifically a UK example. It concerns 
the sale of honours. There were times   earlier this century   
when there was something equivalent to a market in honours. 
For an appropriate payment to a political party, a knighthood, 
baronetcy, or peerage could be bought (the prices differed, of 
course, depending upon the nature of the commodity acquired). 
What was the result? Maximum public indignation and the 
devaluation of the entire honours system. Those awarded on 
merit were subject to the same suspicions as those awarded on 
demerit.
So I would argue that, quite apart from the effects which 
corruption has on economic development, the distortion of 
competition and as a brake on progress, we need to be very 
aware of its insidious effect in poisoning confidence in the 
integrity of the political process. It is also a destroyer of morality 
because its tendency is to make people say: 'If I want to succeed, 
I too must pay my bribe'.
RECENT HISTORY IN THE UK
We have no cause to be critical of others or self-satisfied with 
the record over the last century. I would like to share with you 
some of the chief events in that history which, in a way, provides 
a background to (though not the immediate context for) the 
creation of my committee.
I think perhaps the only virtue which we in this country can 
claim is that, when dark deeds become known, public debate 
ensues and action is generally (though not always) taken; the 
typical responses being the appointment of a Royal Commission 
and the enactment of legislation.
Corrupt elections
Let me start with election corruption some 120 years ago. In 
the 1880 general election there was massive expenditure in the
o 1
constituencies. The candidates between them spent some 
£l.6m. It has been officially estimated that translated into May 
1997 money that represents an expenditure of £ 106m, i.e. very 
nearly twice as much as the combined total spent by the Labour 
and Conservative parties centrally in the 1997 general election 
(in the 19th century elections very little was spent centrally).
The evidence is clear that much of the expenditure by 
candidates in the 1880 election (and no doubt at earlier 
elections too) was devoted to corrupt payments. By way of 
illustration, I cite the detailed account which has come down to 
us of the practices employed at the by-election in the Borough 
of Sandwich in May 1880 (Report of the Commissioners appointed to 
inquire into the existence of Corrupt Practices in the Borough oj Sandwich 
(1881) C-2796 HC (1881) XLV ('Commissioners' Report')). This 
followed shortly after the general election in March of that year. 
The unsuccessful Liberal candidate brought an election petition 
to unseat the Conservative winner. The election court found that 
corrupt practices had been employed. The subsequent inquiry 
by a Royal Commission found that out of a total electorate of 
some 2,000 persons, no less than 1,005 had been bribed by one 
party or the other, and 12 8 voters had taken bribes from both 
sides. The secret ballot, which had been introduced in 1872, did
not act as a deterrent to the bribers. Other corrupt practices 
involved excessive payment to voters for unnecessary services 
(such as the erection of flagpoles) and the hiring of rooms in 
public houses, ostensibly as 'committee rooms' for party 
meetings but in fact as 'a colourable means of gaining the votes
o o o
of the proprietors and of influencing the votes of their 
frequenters' (Commissioners' Report, p. vii). The Conservative 
candidate spent in total about £5600 on winning the election, 
the Liberal roughly half that sum (Commissioners' Report, p. xi). 
None but the very wealthy could enter such a contest. This is 
apparent if one translates £5,600 of 1880 money into 1997 
currency. The result is about £371,000.
A solution was found to prevent repetition of such vast 
expenditure. This was the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act 1883. 
This Act imposed strict limits on what candidates could spend 
locally. It was very effective. However, since 1883 the pattern of 
electioneering has changed. Now huge national expenditure 
dwarfs what is spent locally.
Commercial corruption
In the 1880s, a series of scandals led to the Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act 1889. This was aimed at bribery of public bodies. It 
was the domestic equivalent of the OECD Convention which 
focuses on foreign public officials. More cases involving agents 
came to light in the next twenty years and led»to the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1906. This Act was aimed at all corrupt 
transactions invoking agents.
Insider dealing by ministers
Moving on to Ministers of the Crown, we have the ratherO '
remarkable Marconi scandal from the early years of this century. 
I cannot improve on the account given in my committee's first 
report:
'Between the turn of the century and the outbreak of the First World 
War the Marconi scandal of 1911  13 stands out. Two Government 
Ministers (one of them the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd 
George) bought shares in the American Marconi company before they 
went on sale to the general public but after the British Government, as 
they knew, had signed a large and lucrative contract with the separate 
British Marconi company. The Government Chief Whip also bought 
shares on behalf of the Liberal party. The American Marconi shares, 
after going on sale, doubled in value.
The Ministers at first attempted to conceal what they had done, then, 
when they werejbund out, claimed that, despite appearances, they had 
not been guilty of any wrongdoing. They suffered no adverse political 
consequences (apart from embarrassment). One went on to become 
Prime Minister, the other Lord Chief Justice and Viceroy of India. The 
House of Commons select committee set up to investigate the affair 
divided along party lines in the Ministers'favour, as did the House 
itself. Neither major newspapers nor (perhaps as a consequence) the 
general public took much interest in the affair' (Standards in Public 
Life: First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995) 
Cm 2850-1 p. 104).
Let us consider the Marconi scandal. Here was insider dealing 
on a heroic scale (those in high places sometimes show a strange 
capacity for survival). Perhaps the strangest thing to us   and it 
damages my general theory   is the lack of public outcry. But 
public sensitivity today is of a wholly different order.
First World War
There were two sordid developments during the First World 
War. First, corruption was rife in the securing of arms 
procurement contracts and the like. This led to the hasty 
enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916. Section 2 of 
that Act created a presumption that the receipt of money etc., by 
a public official was received corruptly. The onus was put on the 
defendant to prove his innocence. Nobody at the time was too 
much troubled by this reversal of the standard burden of proof. 
But today, as the Law Commission has persuasively argued, there 
are very great doubts about the legality of the presumption of 
guilt in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Also, at the practical level, there are real doubts as to whether 
that presumption is actually necessary.
Trading in Honours
The second sordid development was that during wartime 
some trading in honours had started. In the autumn of 1917 the 
Government accepted a resolution in the House of Lords 
requiring the Prime Minister in future to satisfy himself that in 
the case of political honours no money had been paid to a 
political party to obtain the honour. The text of the resolution is 
quoted in The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom: Fifth 
Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1998) Cm 4057-1 
p. 184 para. 14.10.
By 1922 it was clear that the 1917 Resolution was wholly 
ineffective. In that year there was a Birthday Honours scandal. 
This involved a South African mine-owner who had a criminal 
record. In exchange for a considerable sum ol money he was to 
have conferred on him a peerage. This was announced in the 
Birthday Honours list. There were huge protests against this 
honour in Parliament and in the press. The South African had to 
be persuaded to decline the honour. An emissary from the 
government visited him in the Savoy Hotel. He was deaf and it 
seems that at first he formed the view that he was being asked 
for more money. However, when the situation was finally 
explained to him, he reluctantly agreed to withdraw.
The King was furious about the whole episode and wrote an 
outraged letter to Lloyd George. He received a rather cool 
response! However, in September of the same year a Royal 
Commission with Lord Dunedin as its chairman was set up to 
look into the Honours System. That Commission found that 
certain persons, stigmatised by the Commission as touts, had 
held themselves out as being able to procure the conferment of 
honours in return for cash payments to a political party. The 
Commission recommended, first, that there should be created a 
Political Honours Scrutiny Committee and, secondly, that a 
statute should be enacted making it a crime to buy or sell 
honours or to offer to do so (Report of the Royal Commission on 
Honours, 22 December 1922, Cmd 1789). This became law in 
1925 (the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925).
At about the same time, there was a case which all lawyers 
recall (Parkinson v College of Ambulance Ltd [1925] 2KB 1) where a 
disappointed briber sought the return of a bribe paid to charity. 
That action failed on the basis that the law could not assist such 
a polluted claim. The 1925 Act had an effect, but one of the 
touts   perhaps the most famous   Mr Maundy Gregory, 
continued to operate for 8 further years until a conviction was 
secured (see generally, T Cullen, Maundy Gregory: Purveyor of 
Honours Bodley Head, 1974).
A relatively quiescent period followed (or perhaps we should 
say a period of undetected crime?). I pass over the Lynskey 
Tribunal and the junior Minister involved, Mr Belcher ME
The Poulson case and the Salmon Report
The next major scandal was the Poulson case. Mr Poulson had 
a huge architectural practice; he also had well-placed backers in 
the ministries, local councils and public bodies. Undoubtedly a 
highly efficient system of public corruption was in place, which 
ran well for many years; that is, until Mr Poulson was sufficiently 
incautious to become bankrupt. Counsel retained by the trustee 
in bankruptcy, by his courageous and probing cross-examination 
of the bankrupt, exposed what had been going on. Numerous 
prosecutions and resignations followed (see 'The Poulson Affair' 
in Ch. 2 of the Report of the Royal Commission on Standards of 
Conduct in Public Life (Chairman: The Rt Hon Lord Salmon), July 
1976. Cm 6524).
A further consequence was that in 1974 the Salmon 
Commission was appointed and in July 1976 recommended an 
overhaul of the corruption law. It also recommended that the 
whole issue of the bribery of MPs should be addressed. There 
followed a classic example of a report being allowed to gather 
dust. Most of the Salmon recommendations were not followed 
up. The Commission was disbanded after it had reported and 
nobody was in a position to call for an effective response from 
Government.
THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN 
PUBLIC LIFE
Moving on to the 1990s, some Conservative Ministers were 
under sustained attack through the media. There were sex 
scandals. Then there were scandals about outgoing ministers 
rapidly taking City appointments and working with or for 
companies with whom they had dealt officially in the recent past. 
Finally, to cap it all, came the allegations of cash for questions, 
that is to say, MPs allegedly taking money to raise questions in 
the House of Commons (thereby highlighting again the whole 
issue of bribery of MPs to which Lord Salmon had drawn 
attention).
The then Prime Minister, the Rt Hon John Major MP, took 
action and on 25 October 1994, created the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life with the agreement of the other party 
leaders. The committee was given the following terms of 
reference:
'To examine current concerns about standards of conduct of all 
holders of public office, including arrangements relating to financial and 
commercial activities, and make recommendations as to any changes in 
present arrangements which might be required to ensure the highest 
standards of propriety in public office.'
A broad definition was given to public life. The committee's 
remit extends to ministers, civil servants, advisers, MPs, MEPs, 
and members of quangos (Hansard, HC 25 October 1994, 
col. 758).
It is interesting to note that the committee was created 
without legislation and without the establishment of a Royal 
Commission. We are independent of government. This is not 
because there is any statutory provision to that effect, but rather 
because the committee would probably all resign if there were 
any overt attempt to put political pressure on us. The committee 11
consists of three representatives of the major political parties, six 
people drawn from 'the great and good' and a chairman who, so 
far, has been a lawyer.
The committee's first report went straight to the moral issue 
and laid down seven principles of public life (the principles are 
set out in full at p. 14 of the report). These are as follows:
  selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, 
honesty and leadership.
The House of Commons adopted these and they have been 
widely incorporated in other codes.
As regards the bribery of MPs, the report called tor a 
reconsideration ot the issue. It recommended the adoption of 
better procedures for 'trying' MPs accused of misconduct. The 
report looked at the corruption statutes and called for their 
reconsideration and consolidation. It also dealt with quangos 
and the issue of political bias in the selection of members of 
quangos.
Recommendations were included for the appointment of a 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards for the House of 
Commons and an independent Public Appointments 
Commissioner to regulate the public appointments process. 
Both recommendations were accepted. The holders of the 
respective offices are Sir Gordon Downey and Sir Leonard 
Peach.
The committee's third report looked at local government 
(Standards of Conduct in Local Government in England, Scotland, and 
Wales: Third Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 
July 1997, Cm 3702-1). In that report the committee called for 
better codes of discipline. It criticised the system of surcharging
local councillors and proposed a new crime of abuse of public 
office.
During the last few months the committee has been looking at 
the funding of political parties (Fifth Report (1998)). This 
obviously includes issues which I have mentioned today, i.e. the 
sources of funding, the processing of honours and perceived 
fears as to the influences being brought to bear on party leaders 
in consequence of the 'arms race' to fight elections on a lavish 
scale.
The recommendations contained in the first three reports of 
the committee have had the effect of stimulating much further 
activity. In addition there is nowr a climate of opinion which 
favours the modernisation of the law in the ongoing crusade 
against corruption and malpractice. Examples are furnished by 
Lord Nicholls' Committee of both Houses which is looking at 
the issue of bribery of MPs and members of the House of Lords; 
the Law Commission's Report Legislating the Criminal Code: 
Corruption (Law Com No 248, HC 524, 2 March 1998); and a 
Home Office Working Party is currently looking at a new 
criminal offence of 'abuse' of public office. And there is much 
else besides in addition to the ongoing labours of the OECD and 
its fight against corruption.
I hope that I have said enough to arouse your interest in the 
work of the Committee on Standards in Public Life and to 
demonstrate its relevance to the moral and legal issues addressed 
in the course of the symposium.  
Patrick Neill QC
Prosecution white collar 
crime - what's going on?
by Rosalind Wright
In her address to the Symposium on Economic Crime, the Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office posed the question 'What is wrong with the present 
system of trying serious and complex fraud cases?'
Lord Roskill, in his report on fraud trials 13 years ago, noted that:
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'criticisms of the judicial process in the present context have stemmed 
largely from the increasing length and complexity of trials of commercial 
fraud cases, leading many people to call into question the 
appropriateness of trial by jury for this type of case.'
In that context, nothing has changed very significantly and in 
1998, the problems of long and complex trials remains.
The Serious Fraud Office was set up in 1987 as a direct result 
of Roskill. It was given a specific and focused remit for the 
investigation and prosecution of serious and complex fraud. It 
investigates and prosecutes the very tip of the fraud iceberg   the 
most serious, the most complex cases   cases "where there is
